“The Charter of New Europe”, signed in Paris in 1990, expresses the right of a state to choose its security arrangements as follows:

In key documents, this right is presented and framed in a way that suggests that a specification of the no-harm principle is included in the OSCE documents. The no-harm principle can be used in analysing the principle adopted by the OSCE that sovereign states are free to choose their own security arrangements. The OSCE principle: states are free to choose their own security arrangements The question of trust seems to be central in this regard. However, whether this is so depends on actual historical developments and contexts. Thus, military alliances can be difficult to reconcile with the principle of no-harm (unlike, for example, police forces, which can provide security to a community and its members in a way that serves the generally accepted common good). In such situations, military alliances and their powers to destroy are, by definition, at least potentially harmful to at least some and perhaps many others. If there is a competitive situation between states or unions, it is often described as a prisoner’s dilemma, a game in which actors prepare for the worst and promote their interests at the expense of others – resulting in a worse outcome for all than cooperation. The expansion of the alliance can strengthen the military strength of the alliance in the same way as armaments. The essence of military alliances is that they are directed against some states that are not part of the alliance (seen as potential threats). I will return to these questions shortly.įrom the point of view of the no-harm principle, military alliances, as well as armaments, could be interpreted as problematic in principle. The problem is, on the one hand, to define what “harm” means and, on the other hand, to specify who can define harm.

In international law, the principle of no-harm is applied for example in environmental matters. This limitation is called the no-harm principle.

In Mill’s theory, individuals are free to do whatever they want, as long as they do not cause harm to other individuals. John Stuart Mill portrays the individual as “sovereign” in his book On Liberty. Many concepts of international law and politics are based on the theory of liberalism, assuming that states are persons too (in international law, states have legal personality). The “sovereign freedom” of the state is analogous to the negative freedom of individuals in liberalism. The no-harm principle of liberalism and military alliances to decide whether or not to ally and with whom. This stance is justified, inter alia, by the fact that the Soviet Union and its successor, Russia, are committed to various OSCE documents expressing the principle that sovereign states are free to choose their security arrangements, i.e. At the end of autumn 2021, the secretary general of NATO Jens Stoltenberg ruled out any agreement that would deny Ukraine the right to join the military alliance, stressing that the decision in this matter belongs solely to Ukraine and 30 NATO countries. In 2021, Russia concentrated its forces on the borders of Ukraine and tried to reach a solution through coercive diplomacy. It is typically argued (or just assumed) that Russia’s official claims are merely misguided attempts at promoting power politics and establishing a sphere of influence. In the West, Russia’s criticism of NATO enlargement has just as often been condemned as unjust and inappropriate. Since 2008, Russia has criticized – often in harsh terms involving warnings or threats of countermeasures – the idea of Ukraine’s future NATO membership. Over time, this controversy has increasingly revolved around Ukraine’s possible NATO membership. NATO enlargement has worsened the relationship between Russia and the West since the 1990s. From this perspective, it is important to consider the normative basis of alliance formation. If the U.S., NATO, and their advocates and apologists continue to hold that every country has some kind of absolute right to become part of NATO when NATO deems that membership good and regardless of consequences, then it is difficult to explore areas of potential agreement. The sooner some such is achieved, the sooner the killing and destruction in Ukraine will end and the lower the risk that the war will continue to escalate – possibly even towards a nuclear war. Most wars end in some kind of reciprocal peace agreement.

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